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Abstract
We study competition between firms in labor mar-
kets, following a combinatorial model suggested by
Kelso and Crawford [14]. In this model, each firm is
trying to recruit workers by offering a higher salary
than its competitors, and its production function de-
fines the utility generated from any actual set of re-
cruited workers. We define two natural classes of
production functions for firms, where the first one is
based on additive capacities (weights), and the sec-
ond on the influence of workers in a social network.
We then analyze the existence of pure subgame per-
fect equilibrium (PSPE) in the labor market and its
properties. While neither class holds the gross sub-
stitutes condition, we show that in both classes the
existence of PSPE is guaranteed under certain re-
strictions, and in particular when there are only two
competing firms. As a corollary, there exists a Wal-
rasian equilibrium in a corresponding combinatorial
auction, where bidders’ valuation functions belong to
these classes.
While a PSPE may not exist when there are more
than two firms, we perform an empirical study of
equilibrium outcomes for the case of weight-based
games with three firms, which extend our analytical
results. We then show that stability can in some cases
be extended to coalitional stability, and study the dis-
tribution of profit between firms and their workers in
weight-based games.
∗Microsoft Israel R&D Center and Hebrew University of
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†Microsoft Israel R&D Center and Technion-Israel Institute
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1 Introduction
Labor markets are matching games with two types of
agents: firms and workers. Typically, each firm can
recruit multiple workers, and is willing to compen-
sate each worker by paying her salary for her work.
An outcome in a labor market therefore consists of a
partition of the workers between firms (possibly with
some idle workers), and the salaries offered by the
firms.
The term worker is quite general, and may refer to
an employee, a consultant, a sub-contractor, or any
other small service provider that the firm recruits.
When considering interactions between a firm and its
employees, the firm typically decides on the wage it
offers to each employee. The employee, in turn, may
either take the job for the proposed salary, or turn
down the offer.
Whereas most classical models of labor markets as-
sume some uniform, divisible workforce (e.g. [13]), we
will consider in this paper games with a finite num-
ber of firms and workers, following a model suggested
by Kelso and Crawford [14]. This model allows for a
rich combinatorial description of the synergies among
workers working for the same company. In the most
general case, an arbitrary value can be assigned to
any group of workers and a particular firm. How-
ever, typically there is some structure to the value
function (a.k.a. production function) that is derived
from the context.
As a simple example, consider a game where we can
attribute some fixed “productivity level”, capacity, or
weight to each worker. The value generated by a firm
is then some function of the total (additive) capacity
of its workers. A concrete example for such a scenario
is when firms compete for hiring suppliers that differ
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in “weight”, which can be the amount of storage they
supply, or number of patents they own. The utility
of each firm is increasing in the total storage or total
number of patents it acquires, regardless of how it is
divided among the hired suppliers.
Perhaps a more intricate scenario is when firms are
recruiting influential members of a social network,
trying to promote some new product. The value for
a firm in this case is proportional to the joint influ-
ence of the recruited workers, which depends on the
network structure and dynamics.
A natural question that arises in labor markets is
the following: which outcomes, if at all, are stable?
That is, which partitions and salaries guarantee that
no firm or worker could gain by deviating from the
current agreements. The answer of course depends
on the game description (i.e. the value functions),
but also on the bargaining dynamics and the allowed
strategies. Kelso and Crawford [14] analyze a par-
ticular bargaining process, whose outcomes (in case
of convergence) are referred to as the core. They
provide sufficient conditions for the existence of the
core—namely, that all firms’ value functions hold a
technical property called gross substitutes (See Ap-
pendix B.1 for a formal definition). They also de-
scribe examples where it fails to exist.
We consider a simple two-step dynamics, where at
the first step firms commit to salaries, and in the sec-
ond step workers choose which firm to join. These
dynamics define a game in extensive form, which we
call the competition game. It turns out that the set of
pure subgame perfect Nash equilibria (PSPE) in this
two-step competition game coincides with the core,
as defined in [14]. Our primary goal is to charac-
terize the conditions under which a PSPE exists for
firms with value functions based on capacities or so-
cial connections. In particular, we are interested in
extending the results of Kelso and Crawford on exis-
tence of equilibrium to cases that are not covered by
the gross-substitutes condition.
Nevertheless, we care not only about existence, but
also ask what are the properties of such a stable out-
come in terms of welfare, fairness, stability against
group deviations, etc.
1.1 Structure of the paper
In Section 2 we formally define our two-step game,
and classes of valuation functions inspired by the ex-
amples of competition over capacity and influence.
We then introduce the equilibrium concepts used
in the paper and explain in detail the connections
between our model, the model of Kelso and Craw-
ford [14] (henceforth, the “KC model”) and other re-
lated models of competition. In particular, we show
the equivalence between PSPE in our model, the core
in the KC model, and Walrasian equilibrium in com-
binatorial auctions.
In Section 3 we present some basic properties of
PSPE in our setting and of the linear programs asso-
ciated with it.
In Section 4 we study games with additive capac-
ities (weights) and show that an equilibrium always
exists with two firms. A special case of weight-based
games is uniform weights. This case, where all work-
ers are homogeneous, entails gross-substitutes value
functions, and therefore existence of PSPE with par-
ticularly natural properties follows from [14]. We ex-
tend their result by showing that there always ex-
ists a coalition-proof equilibrium in the homogenous
case. In games with arbitrary capacities and more
than two firms, a PSPE may not exist. However,
the same natural strategy profile that yields an equi-
librium in the previous cases can be generalized and
used as a heuristic solution. We show through analy-
sis and through an empirical study that this profile is
usually quite stable, and that a PSPE almost always
exists. We conclude the section with a study of the
distribution of profit between firms and workers in
equilibrium.
In the social network model, studied in Section 5,
we prove the existence of equilibrium for two firms
when the network is sufficiently sparse. We also
demonstrate that our conditions for existence are
minimal, in the sense that by relaxing any of them
we can construct a game with no equilibrium.
Our results are summarized in Table 2 on Page 17.
We conclude in Section 6, where we discuss related
work and the implications of our results, and sug-
gest questions for future research. In particular, we
explain that our results entail the existence of Wal-
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rasian equilibrium in auctions where bidders have
value functions based on either capacities or on in-
fluence in social networks.
Due to space constraints and to allow continuous
reading, some content has been deferred to the ap-
pendix. Omitted proofs are available in Appendix A.
Examples of games used in the paper can be found
in Appendix B. The details of our experimental set-
ting used for the emprical part of Section 4, appear
in Appendix C.
2 Preliminaries
We denote vectors by bold lowercase letters, e.g.
a = (a1, a2, . . .). Sets are typically denoted by capi-
tal letters, e.g. B = {1, 2, . . .}. When a is a vector
of indexed elements and B is a set of indices, we use
the shorthand notation a(B) =
∑
b∈B ab.
In a competition game we have a set N of n workers
and a set K of k firms, where k ≥ 2. Each firm i ∈ K
is associated with a non-decreasing value function vi :
2N → R+, where vi(∅) = 0. The competition game
G = 〈N,K, (vi)i∈K〉 is a 2-step game in extensive
form as follows.
Step 1 Played by all firms simultaneously. The
strategy of every firm i ∈ K is a payment policy
xi. That is, i promises to every worker j that
will join it a payment of xij .
Step 2 Played by all workers simultaneously. The
strategy of every worker j ∈ N is choosing a firm
i ∈ K, and is conditioned on the policies selected
in step 1. Workers are allowed to remain idle by
not choosing any firm.
Let X ∈ Rk×n be the commitment matrix, where
X(i, j) = xij .
• A possible outcome of the game is (P,X), where
P = (S0, S1, . . . , Sk) is a partition of workers to
firms. S0 contains workers that abstained (re-
mained idle).
• Each worker j that chose firm i, gains a utility of
xij , where x0,j ≡ 0. For each j ∈ Si, we denote
the realized payment to worker j by xˆj = xij .
• Each firm i gains a profit of ri(P,X) = vi(Si)−
xˆ(Si).
Note that payments (promised or realized) may be
negative in the general case. We denote by SW (P )
the sum of utilities of all the agents in a given parti-
tion. Note that for every X,
SW (P ) = SW (P,X) =
∑
i∈K
ri +
∑
j∈N
xˆj
=
∑
i∈K

ri +
∑
j∈Si
xij

 =
∑
i∈K
vi(Si),
i.e. the social welfare does not depend on x, but only
on the partition of workers.
We restrict our attention to pure strategies only.
This includes both the payment policies of the firms,
and the decisions of the workers.
2.1 Value functions
We use the notation mi for the marginal value of
a worker to firm i. For every S ⊆ N and j /∈ S,
mi(j, S) = vi(S ∪ {j})− vi(S).
vi is submodular (a.k.a. concave), if vi(S ∪ T ) +
vi(S ∩ T ) ≤ vi(S) + vi(T ) for all S, T ⊆ N . It is
strictly submodular if the inequality is strict. Equiv-
alently, vi is submodular if the marginal contribu-
tion is nonincreasing. That is, for all T ⊆ S and
j /∈ S, mi(j, T ) ≥ mi(j, S). If the [strict] inequality
holds only when S, T are disjoint, then we say that
vi is [strictly] subadditive. All value functions stud-
ied in this paper are submodular, i.e. have decreasing
marginal returns. This assumption is standard in the
economics literature [6, 3].
We say that workers j and j′ are of the same type if
all firms are indifferent between them. That is, if for
all i ∈ K, S ⊆ N \ {j, j′}, vi(S ∪ {j}) = vi(S ∪ {j′}).
Similarly, we say that firms i and i′ have the same
type, if vi ≡ vi′ . Games where all firms are of the
same type are called symmetric games.
Homogeneous games In the simplest form of
games, called homogeneous games, all workers are of
the same type. In such games each vi : [n]→ R+ is a
function of the number of the workers selecting firm
i, i.e. vi(S) = vi(|S|).
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Weighted games The primary type of value func-
tions we consider in this work is based on capacities,
or weights. Each worker has some predefined integer
weightwj , and the value of a set S depends only on its
total weight. Thus each vi is a function vi : N→ R+,
where vi(S) = vi
(∑
j∈S wj
)
.
A game where all value functions are weight-based
is called a weighted game. Homogeneous games are
a special case of weighted games, where all workers
have the same weight (w.l.o.g. weight 1).
A partition P = (S1, . . . , Sk) of workers in a
weighted game is balanced, if the total weight of work-
ers that choose each firm is the same, i.e. w(Si) =
w(Si′ ) for all i, i
′. A partition is almost balanced if
the total weight of any Si and Si′ differ by at most
1.
Influence in social networks Another value
function we consider is inspired by social networks.
In a social network, we have a directed underlying
graph, augmented with some deterministic or prob-
abilistic process of information flow. The influence
of a set of nodes in the graph is the expected num-
ber of nodes that get a message broadcasted by the
original set (assuming some specific dynamics, for
example one of the models suggested by Kempe et
al. [15]). Every social network then induces a compe-
tition game, where the workers are some particular
set of influential nodes for hire, and firms try to re-
cruit workers with maximal influence in the network.
For the formal model see Section 5.
Synergy graphs Simple synergies between work-
ers (or between items in a combinatorial auction) can
be represented by a weighted undirected graph, where
every vertex corresponds to a worker, and the value
of a set is the total weight of edges linked to vertices
in the set. This includes edges between vertices in
the set, and edges between these vertices and exter-
nal vertices.1 In Section 5 we show that competition
1If we only consider edges within the set, the value func-
tion coincides with that of induced subgraph games, as defined
by Deng and Papadimitriou [9]. While our definition of syn-
ergy graphs implies a submodular value function, the value in
induced subgraph games is supermodular.
games induced by synergy graphs coincide with a par-
ticular type of social network games.
All classes described above—except homogenous
valuations—may violate the gross-substitute condi-
tion. See Example B.1 in the appendix for details.
2.2 Equilibrium concepts
In a general game of the form we described there
can be many pure Nash equilibria, but most of them
are uninteresting. Formally, workers are allowed to
play any strategy of the 2-step game (i.e. commit
to some partition for every possible choice of firms’
policies). Then the following, for example is a Nash
equilibrium: firms keep all profit to themselves, while
workers play an arbitrary fixed partition. In the other
extreme, workers can commit to go only with firms
that keep at most ǫ for an arbitrarily small ǫ > 0
(if there is more than one such firm, all workers pick
the firm with the smallest index). If all firms charge
more, all workers go to the one that charges the least.
In equilibrium, firm 1 gets all workers, but keeps a
profit of ǫ from each.
Subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium It is clear
from the observation above that many Nash equilib-
ria are not really plausible, especially when there are
no binding agreements between workers. We there-
fore need some equilibrium refinement, and the nat-
ural candidate is pure subgame perfect Nash equilib-
rium (PSPE). Indeed, this means that the workers
are not allowed to make non-credible threats, and for
any choice of policies must play an equilibrium strat-
egy (of N), given these policies.
Formally, given any payment matrix X we denote
by P(X) the set of partitions where each worker plays
a weakly dominant strategy w.r.t. X. That is, each
j∈N selects a firm i offering the highest payoff. We
assume workers use a known tie-breaking rule, so that
the result of offering payoffs of X is a unique well-
defined partition P (X) ∈ P(X).
Definition 1. An outcome (P,X) is a pure subgame
perfect equilibrium (PSPE) if (a) P = P (X); and (b)
for every i ∈ K and x′i, ri(P ′,X′) ≤ ri(P,X), where
X′ = (x−i,xi), P
′ = P (X′).
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Since the behavior of the workers is straight-
forward (playing according to P (X), the game effec-
tively reduces to the first step.
Observation 2.1. Let G be a competition game,
and let (P,X) be a PSPE. Then for all i ∈ K and
j ∈ Si, there is at least one additional firm i′ 6= i (and
w.l.o.g. all firms), that is offering xi′j = xji = xˆj
(otherwise i could have offered a lower amount). The
PSPE outcome (P,X) can therefore be written as
(P,x), where xj = xˆj for all j ∈ N . This obser-
vation greatly facilitates the analysis of PSPEs.
The core Kelso and Crawford [14] define the core
of a labor market as an outcome (partition of work-
ers and salaries) from which there is no group that
can deviate in a way that makes all of them strictly
gain. In the model they consider,2 they show that
w.l.o.g. it is sufficient to consider groups of one firm
and several workers.
Lemma 2.2. An outcome (P,x) is a PSPE in our
two-step game if and only if it belongs to the core of
the corresponding labor market in the KC model.
Proof. Indeed, if there is a firm i ∈ K and workers
C ⊆ N that can gain by deviating in the KC model
using payoffs (x′ij)j∈C , then firm i can offer salary
x′ij > xˆj in the two-step game to each j ∈ C (and 0
to every other worker). In the second step all workers
of C will move to i according to their subgame-perfect
strategy.3 In the other direction, if some firm i ∈ K
can deviate from (P,x) in the two-step game, and
remains with a set of workers S′i, then the coalition
{i} ∪ S′i violates the core constraints. 
Combinatorial auctions One can think of an al-
ternative interpretation of our model, where firms are
bidders in a combinatorial auction, and the workers
are the “items”. The valuation of a bundle S of items
to each bidder i is defined by vi(S). Every bidder
submits a sealed bid for each item, which goes to the
highest bidder.
2In the KC model workers may have idiosyncratic prefer-
ences over firms. Our model is a special case where all firms
are treated equally by workers.
3Note that in our model this is considered a deviation of a
single player—the firm i.
Observation 2.3. Our two-step game between firms
and workers is equivalent to a first price auction over
the items (a separate but simultaneous auction for
each item). Further, every PSPE coincides exactly
with a Nash equilibrium of the auction.
Indeed, the dominant strategy of each worker in
the second step is equivalent to the auction rule that
every item must go to the highest bidder. A devi-
ation of a firm in the first step is equivalent to a
deviation of a bidder to an alternative bidding vec-
tor. Further, it is known that the Nash equilibrium of
the first price combinatorial auction (and hence also
our PSPE) coincides with a Walrasian equilibrium in
the Arrow-Debreu model, in terms of item (worker)
allocation and the realized prices (xˆ1, . . . , xˆn); and
that Walrasian equilibrium coincides with the core of
the KC model. See Table 1 for an illustration of the
connections between the models.
By this correspondence between the core, Wal-
rasian equilibrium and PSPE, existence results trans-
late directly from one model to the other.
Coalition-proof equilibrium Standard PSPE,
just like Nash equilibrium, guarantee that no single
agent can gain by deviating from the outcome. How-
ever, it does not preclude the formation of coalitions,
who will make a joint deviation in an attempt to bias
the outcome. In contrast with the core of the KC
model, coalitions of two or more firms in our model
may have substantially more power. A coalition of
all firms can decide, for example, to cut all salaries
by half without the approval of the workers.
An intrinsic problem with the formation of such
coalition, is that the coalition itself may not be sta-
ble. That is, it may contain an agent (or a subset
of agents) that will change its strategy again, know-
ing how the other members of the coalition will play.
A solution concept that was introduced in particular
to demonstrate resistance to such unstable collusion
is coalition-proof equilibrium [1]. We slightly modify
the definition to fit in our context.
Definition 2. An outcome of competition game
(P,X) is a Coalition-Proof subgame perfect equi-
librium (CP-PSPE), if (a) The outcome (P,X) is a
PSPE; and
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Labor markets: Our model (a) the KC model
(firms, workers) PSPE ↔ the core
l (d) l (b)
Combinatorial auctions: First price auction with sealed bids (c) the Arrow-Debreu model
(bidders, items) pure Nash equilibrium ↔ Walrasian equilibrium
Table 1: The relations between the various models, and their respective equilibrium concepts (in italics).
The equivalences follow from: (a) Lemma. 2.2; (b) [11]; (c) [12] ; (d) Obv. 2.3.
(b) Consider a coalition R = K ′∪N ′ and a deviation
of R to a (pure) profile zK′ , QN ′ that induces the
outcome (Q,Z) = ((P ′−N ′ , QN ′), (x−K′ , zK)) where
P ′ = P (Z) (i.e. non-deviating workers select each
the highest paying firm). If all of R strictly gain by
this deviation, then there is some agent g ∈ R (either
a firm or a worker) that can strictly gain by deviating
from (Q,Z) to some other strategy.
Our definition is stronger (i.e., implies a higher
level of stability) than the standard definition of
coalition-proofness in the sense that the profile must
also be a PSPE, and also since it only allows a single
agent to re-deviate from the coalition R.
Finally, we define the outcome (P,X) as a
cartel-proof PSPE, if it is coalition-proof only
w.r.t. coalitions of firms (without workers). Thus
cartel-proofness is somewhat weaker than coalition-
proofness.
Lemma 2.4. G has a PSPE if and only if G has a
cartel-proof PSPE.
We emphasize that cartel-proof PSPEs do not nec-
essarily coincide with the KC core. For example,
firms may deviate together by lowering all salaries
by a small constant.
Policy types We also consider other natural re-
quirements that policies may hold. A payment pol-
icy xi = (xi,1, . . . , xi,n) is fair if for every pair j, j
′ of
the same type, it holds that xij = xij′ . Fair policies
are necessary for example in some Internet settings,
where the firm can verify a worker’s type, but not
her identity. In weighted games, a policy xi is pro-
portional, if for all j, j′ it holds that
xij
xij′
=
wj
wj′
. Any
proportional policy is fair.
We say that an outcome (P,X) is fair [respectively:
proportional ], if all the policies x1, . . . ,xk are fair
[resp.: proportional]. Note that we do not externally
enforce fairness nor proportionality.
3 Properties of equilibrium
outcomes
PSPEs have many desired properties, which motivate
the search for such outcomes. In addition, some of
these properties will be used as tools in the next sec-
tions to prove existence and non-existence of PSPEs
in various games.
The first property is a technical condition, which
basically means that a firm cannot gain by recruiting
or releasing a single worker.
Lemma 3.1. Let (P,x) be a PSPE outcome in game
G. Then for all i ∈ K and j ∈ Si,
1. xj ≤ mi(j, Si \ {j}).
2. For any i′ 6= i, xj ≥ mi′(j, Si′ ).
3.1 Individual rationality, Fairness
and Envy freeness
We next present three simple observations (phrased
as lemmas), showing that a PSPE outcome is always
individually rational, envy free, and that w.l.o.g. it
is fair.
Workers always have the option to remain without
a firm and get a payment of 0. This means that a
worker will never join (in equilibrium) a firm that is
offering a negative payment. Firms can preclude cer-
tain workers from joining their coalition, by offering
them a strictly negative payment.
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As a result, the profit of a firm in equilibrium is also
non-negative, as it can always do better by refusing
all workers. The following observation concludes that
no agent is harmed by participating in the competi-
tion game.
Lemma 3.2 (Individual rationality). Let (P,x) be a
PSPE outcome in game G, then (1) xj ≥ 0 for all
j ∈ N ; and (2) v(Si)− x(Si) ≥ 0 for all i ∈ K.
We say that firm i envies firm t in an outcome
(P,x), if i wants to trade workers and payments.
That is, if vi(St) −
∑
j∈St
xj > vi(Si) −
∑
j∈Si
xj(=
ri(P,x)). An outcome is envy-free if no firm envies
any other firm.
Lemma 3.3 (Envy freeness). Let (P,x) be a PSPE
outcome in game G. Then (P,x) is envy-free.
The above holds because an envious firm i can al-
ways dismiss its workers Si and recruit St instead.
Since payments are fixed, i only needs to pay more
than
∑
j∈St
xj and with a sufficiently small extra
payment this is a profitable deviation. The proof of
Lemma 3.4 appears in the appendix.
Lemma 3.4 (Fairness). If (P,x) is a PSPE in game
G, then there is a fair outcome (P,x∗) that is a PSPE
in G, where the profit of each firm remains the same.
3.2 LP formulation
There are two natural ways to describe a PSPE with
a linear program.
ILP relaxation and the welfare theorems
Computational schemes for representing combinato-
rial markets and to solve them (i.e., to compute a
Walrasian equilibrium) have been thoroughly stud-
ied (see Blumrosen and Nisan [5] for details). Since
PSPE coincides with the Walrasian equilibrium of a
corresponding combinatorial market (as explained in
Section 2.2), we can infer some important properties
of PSPEs, and apply standard techniques from the
literature for computing them. The first and most
fundamental property is about efficiency.
First welfare theorem (FWT). Every Wal-
rasian equilibrium, if exists, is optimal in terms of
the social welfare.
As an immediate corollary from the first welfare
theorem, we get that if (P,x) is a PSPE, then P
necessarily maximizes the social welfare.
There is a standard Integer Linear Program, de-
noted ILP (G), whose solutions describe the optimal
partition in the game. The Linear Program Relax-
ation of ILP (G) is denoted by LPR(G). The sec-
ond welfare theorem (SWT) states that a Walrasian
equilibrium (and thus PSPE) exists if and only if the
intergrality gap of ILP (G) is zero, i.e. if the solution
quality of ILP (G) and LPR(G) is the same. More-
over, in such cases it is known that the solutions to
the dual linear program of LPR(G) yield the market
clearing prices, which correspond to the equilibrium
strategies (salaries) of the firms in PSPE.
From a computational complexity perspective, it
is known that if demand queries for every vi can be
computed in polynomial time,4 then LPR(G) (and
thus also ILP (G) when an equilibrium exists) can
be solved efficiently.
Partition dependent program While solving
LPR(G) is an elegant way to handle the problem, it
may be quite challenging in practice, especially when
demand queries are hard to compute. We propose
a simple linear program that is designed to find the
equilibrium payoffs, given an optimal partition. If an
equilibrium fails to exist, or if the given partition is
not optimal, the program will have no valid solutions.
For every potential deviation of a firm (i.e. dis-
missing several workers and recruiting others), we can
write the requirement that the firm does not gain as a
linear constraint. We denote the linear program cor-
responding to a partition P in game G by LP (G,P ),
over the variables x1, . . . , xn. LP (G,P ) has the fol-
lowing constraints:
∀i ∈ K, ∀A ⊆ Si, ∀B ⊆ N\Si, vi(Si)−x(A) ≥ vi((Si\A)∪B)−x(B).
4 The input of a demand query over a valuation function
vi is a payoff vector x, and its output is the optimal set of
workers for these payoffs, i.e. argmaxS⊆N vi(S)− x(S).
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The constraints in Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2 are special
cases. This linear program can be used to compute
equilibrium outcomes in a given game once an opti-
mal partition is known, as detailed in Section 3.3. It
has the additional advantage over LPR(G), that we
can tailor the optimization goal to our needs. For
example, to maximize firms’ revenue or to minimize
it.
3.3 Computation and complexity
Suppose we want to compute a PSPE for a given
competition game G. By SWT, the standard way
of computing an equilibrium when one exists, is to
solve LPR(G) (or, more precisely, its dual). How-
ever, there are several drawbacks to this approach.
First, we do not have an explicit representation of
the partition, and we do not know if it is a legal solu-
tion to the original problem ILP (G) (i.e. if a PSPE
exists). Second, even in cases where we know that a
PSPE must exist, efficiently solving LPR(G) requires
an efficient algorithm to compute demand queries on
vi. Unfortunately, computing the optimal partition—
and thus solving a demand query—is NP-hard even
for weighted games. To see this, observe that finding
the optimal partition in a weighted game with two
symmetric firms coincides with the Partition prob-
lem.5 Finally, there may be more than one PSPE and
we want to study the full range of equilibria.
We therefore apply a simpler computation method.
By FWT, we can divide this task into two parts: first
find an optimal partition P , and then compute a sta-
ble payment vector x by solving the linear program
LP (G,P ). While both tasks are still computationally
challenging in the general case, we can make some
simplifying assumptions. If we can limit the number
of firms and/or the number of workers’ types, then
efficient algorithms exist. See Proposition A.1 in the
appendix for details.
In weighted games we can further exploit symme-
tries among workers for a more efficient computation
(see Proposition A.2).
5Similarly, computing the optimal partition for two firms
in a symmetric game over a synergy graph is equivalent to the
NP-hard problem of MaxCut.
4 Weighted games
The first class of value functions we study is based
on capacities, or weights. Recall that a weight based
value function v : N → R+ is a subadditive func-
tional, which maps the total weight of a set of work-
ers w(S) to utility (thus v(S) is submodular). We
sometimes write v as a vector of w(N) + 1 entries
(v(0), v(1), . . . , v(w(N))), where by convention, the
first entry v(0) = 0.
Before continuing to our existence results, we ob-
serve that without the subadditivity assumptions,
weighted games may not posses a PSPE even in a
most simple scenario. Indeed, consider a homoge-
neous and symmetric game with a weighted (non-
subadditive) value function v = (0, 3, 4, 6), two firms,
and three workers. It is easy to verify using the prop-
erties showed in the previous sections that this game
has no PSPE (see Example B.2 in the appendix for
details).
Homogeneous games Suppose that all workers
have unit weight. Kelso and Crawford [14] show that
in such games the core is always non-empty. It follows
that a PSPE always exists. Moreover, when firms are
symmetric, then such a PSPE has a particularly sim-
ple form.
Indeed, it is not hard to see that the most efficient
partition of workers (in terms of social welfare) is one
that is almost balanced. Otherwise, a worker can
improve the welfare by moving from an overloaded
firm to one that has two workers less. Let q = ⌊n/k⌋
and δ = v(q+1)−v(q). By FWT, in any PSPE every
firm has either q or q+1 workers. Also, by Lemma 3.1,
there is a PSPE where the payoff to every worker is
δ (and unless the partition is exactly balanced, this
is the unique PSPE).
4.1 The case of two firms
Consider a symmetric weighted game with two firms
and only two workers N = {h, l}, where wh ≥ wl.
This simple case can be solved as follows. Let xl =
v(wl + wh) − v(wh), and xh = v(wl + wh) − v(wl),
i.e. we set the payment of each worker to be its own
marginal contribution to the set N . Then, the policy
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of each firm is to pay xj to each j ∈ N . It is easy to
verify that these policies admit two PSPEs, where in
each there is one worker per firm.
However, the described policy is not necessarily
proportional. A proportional outcome, which is also
a PSPE, would be to pay xj = v(wj) to each worker
j ∈ {l, h}. If v is strictly subadditive, then there are
also other proportional PSPEs where the firms keep
some of the profit. We next show that we can always
find a proportional PSPE for two firms and any num-
ber of workers. Note that we only require that each
value function will be subadditive.
We next lay our main existence result for the
weighted setting.
Theorem 4.1. Let G = 〈N,K,w, v1, v2〉 be a
weighted competition game with two firms, then G
admits a proportional PSPE.
The proof hinges on the idea of computing the
marginal value of a unit of weight. However in the
general case this is an evasive notion that requires
a nontrivial case analysis (see Appendix A.4). We
bring here a simplified proof of the symmetric case.
sketch of the symmetric case. Indeed, let
P = (S1, S2) be an optimal partition. Denote
H = w(S1), L = w(S2), and suppose that L ≤ H .
By optimality, the gap H − L is minimal. We define
δ = v(H)−v(L)H−L , and argue that it induces a PSPE
(P,x), where x = δ · w. Indeed, the profit of a firm
with workers of total weight q is r(q) = v(q) − δq.
This is a concave function in q, with maximum in
q∗ = ⌊W/2⌋. Denote ∆ = H − L. In P we have
∆r1 = ∆(v(H)−Hδ) = ∆v(H)−H(v(H)− v(L))
= H · v(L)− L · v(H)
∆r2 = ∆(v(L)− Lδ) = ∆v(L)− L(v(H)− v(L))
= H · v(L)− L · v(H) = ∆r1
This means that r1 = r2, and by minimality of the
gap, firms cannot get closer to the theoretical optimal
profit r(q∗): if a firm i deviates, it necessarily ends up
with a set of workers S′i, s.t. |w(S′i)− q∗| ≥ |w(Si)−
q∗|, and thus r′i = r(q′i) ≤ r(qi) = ri. 
4.2 More than two firms
A question that naturally arises is whether we can
generalize Theorem 4.1, i.e. prove that a PSPE al-
ways exists for any number of firms, perhaps even
with the additional requirement of proportionality. A
result by Gul and Staccheti [11] shows that whenever
there is a firm/bidder whose value function violates
gross-substitutes, it is possible to construct an exam-
ple (with additional unit-demand bidders) where an
equilibrium does not exist. While their construction
does not apply directly to our case, it gives little hope
that a PSPE exists in the general case of weighted
games.
Indeed, Proposition 4.3 below shows that a PSPE
is not guaranteed for multiple firms. We first put
forward a simple example showing that a proportional
PSPE may not exist.
Example 4.2. Consider a symmetric game G∗
where w1 = 5, w2 = 6, w3 = 7, and v(5) =
124, v(6) = 126, v(7) = 127. Clearly in the optimal
partition each firm has a single worker. Suppose there
is some proportional PSPE, where xj = δ·wj for all j.
Then by Envy-freeness (Lemma 3.3), all three firms
make the same profit, i.e.
r1 = r2 = r3 ⇒ v(5)−5δ (#1)= v(6)−6δ (#2)= v(7)−7δ.
By Eq. (#1), δ = v(6) − v(5) = 2, whereas by (#2),
δ = v(7)− v(6) = 1. A contradiction.
Proposition 4.3. For any k ≥ 3, there is a symmet-
ric weighted competition game with k firms that does
not have a PSPE at all.
An example proving the proposition appears in the
appendix (Example B.3). We hereby construct an
example with k = 4 firms.
Example 4.4. Our game G has 9 workers in to-
tal, where the weights are (2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, 5).
We define v(w) = min{w, 6}.6 We claim
that the optimal partition must be ei-
ther P1 = ({5}, {3, 2, 2}, {3, 3}, {2, 2, 2}) or
6In fact, most subadditive functions will work. We selected
one that simplifies the argument.
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P2 = ({3, 2}, {5, 2}, {3, 3}, {2, 2, 2}) (up to per-
mutations of agents of the same type). See Fig. 1.
By the shape of v, the optimal partition minimizes
|{i ∈ K : w(Si) < w′}| for w′ = 1, then for
w′ = 2, 3, 4, etc. Indeed, the total weight is 24, but it
cannot be divided in a balanced way. Thus we get that
every optimal partition has total weights of (5, 7, 6, 6).
P1 and P2 are the only ways to construct such a par-
tition. In terms of the integrality gap, this is an ex-
ample of a weighted game with IG(G) = 23.523 =
47
46 .
Next, we want to assign payments.
S1 S2 S3 S4 w
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
v
64
96
112
120
124
126
127
Figure 1: The optimal partition P1.
By Lemma 3.4, we can set a uniform payment
to each type of workers, thus we should determine
the values of x2, x3 and x5. Now, by Envy-freeness
(Lemma 3.3), r3 = r4, and thus 0 = r3 − r4 =
(v(6) − 3x2) − (v(6) − 2x3) = 3x2 − 2x3. Similarly,
firms 1 and 2 can trade the 5-worker for the set {2, 3}.
Thus x5 = x2 + x3. We get that x must be a propor-
tional payment vector, where x = δw for some unit
payoff δ. However, firms 1,2 and 3 have a total weight
of 5,7 and 6 respectively, exactly as in the game G∗ in
Example 4.2. As we show above, such a proportional
payment vector cannot be stable. ⋄
The last result seems discouraging, as in certain sit-
uations a stable outcome may not exist at all. Never-
theless, this is a worst-case outcome. We argue that
such cases are quite rare and do not represent the
common situation. We assert that at least for the
case of symmetric firms, a PSPE usually exists. We
support this assertion using both a formal argument
and an experimental study. First, we prove that if
the weights of the workers allow for the formation
of an almost balanced partition, then we can find a
proportional PSPE, regardless of the value function
v. Note that when weights are small integers, there
is typically an almost-balanced partition.7 We then
generate weighted games from a simple distribution,
showing that they usually admit a PSPE.
Proposition 4.5. Let G = 〈N,K,w, v〉 be a
weighted competition game with k symmetric firms.
(a) If there is an almost-balanced partition of w, then
G admits a proportional PSPE. (b) symmetry is a
necessary condition.
The proof of part (a) is in Appendix A.4. Part (b)
is demonstrated by Example B.4 in the appendix,
which shows that a PSPE may not exist in asym-
metric games, even when there is a fully balanced
partition.
Experimental study of stability with three
firms The full details of our experimental setting
appear in Appendix C.1, and our results on stabil-
ity are in Appendix C.2. We only bring here a short
summary of the results.
We generated over 6000 random instances of
weighted competition games with three symmetric
firms and up to 14 workers. Although less than a
third of the instances admitted an almost balanced
partition, in all but 4 instances a PSPE was found.
In fact, in most generated instances, there is a
proportional PSPE that can be found using sim-
ple heuristics. Recall that for two symmetric firms,
we computed the “unit payoff” δ, as the average
marginal contribution of a single unit of weight
in the optimal partition. That is, let P ∗ be the
optimal partition, i+ = argmaxi∈K w(Si), i− =
argmini∈K w(Si), and d = w(Si+ ) − w(Si− ). Then
δ =
v(w(Si+ ))−v(w(S−))
d . In the induced proportional
payoff vector, x∗j = δ · wj for all j ∈ N .
Note that for any weighted game we can compute
(P ∗,x∗) and use it as a heuristic solution, hoping
that no firm will have a strong incentive to deviate.
By Proposition 4.5, this heuristic solution is always a
PSPE when the gap d is at most 1 (i.e. P ∗ is almost-
7For example, if there are at least k ·maxj wj workers with
weight 1, then an almost-balanced partition must exist.
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balanced). The experimental results show how its
performance gradually deteriorates as d is increasing.
It turns out that in more than half of the total
tested instances (including third of the non-almost-
balanced instances), the maximal gain is 0. That
is, (P ∗,x∗) is a PSPE. Further, only in 6% of the
generated instances there was an agent (firm) that
could improve its profit by more than 5%. In other
words, (P ∗,x∗) is an ǫ-PSPE outcome for ǫ < 0.05
for over 94% of the instances (when the profit r is
normalized to 1).
We note that the size of the gap d tends to de-
crease as we increase the diversity of workers (i.e.
the number of types). Therefore, if we avoid limiting
the number of types then the heuristic solution works
even better.
We do not claim that our random sample is charac-
teristic of every possible scenario. It may well be the
case that with more than three firms, or with a differ-
ent distribution of workers’ weights, a higher number
of “bad” instances emerge. We do feel however that
these experimental results strengthen the conclusion,
that when faced with a given weighted game, then
(a) it is very likely to have a PSPE; and (b) heuristic
proportional payoffs will usually be quite stable.
4.3 Coalitional stability
Homogenous games As mentioned above, exis-
tence of PSPE in this case follows as a special case
from the existence of the core in the KC model. How-
ever, in our model this result can be significantly
strengthened as follows.
Since a PSPE exists, we know by Lemma 3.4 that
a fair PSPE also exists. It follows that there is some
value δ = δ(G) and a partition P = P (G), s.t. if
workers split according to P and are paid xj = δ
each, no worker or firm wants to deviate. For a given
game G, let (P ∗, δ∗) be the PSPE of this form, where
δ
∗ = δ∗(G) = (δ∗, δ∗, . . . , δ∗) for the lowest possible
value of δ∗.
Proposition 4.6. Let G be a homogeneous competi-
tion game. Then (P ∗, δ∗) is a CP-PSPE in G.
Proof. W.l.o.g. all workers weigh 1. Assume, toward
a contradiction, that there is a coalition R = K ′∪N ′
that can deviate from the proposed solution to some
other partition P ′ = (S′1, . . . , S
′
k) and a payoff vector
x′. We now divide into several cases.
Case 1. Suppose first that K ′ 6= K, i.e. at least
one firm is not part of the coalition R. Consider any
i ∈ K ′. Since there is at least one firm that keeps the
original strategy, i must pay at least δ∗ to all of its
workers j ∈ S′i, and strictly more than δ∗ if j ∈ N ′
(regardless of the strategies of K ′ \ {i}). Therefore i
cannot strictly gain, as this would entail a unilateral
deviation of i from the PSPE profile (P ∗, δ∗).
Case 2. K ⊆ R. Denote by Ai ⊆ S′i all workers
that get strictly less than δ∗, i.e. xˆ′j < δ
∗. We claim
that Ai 6= ∅ for all i ∈ K. Indeed, if a firm pays at
least δ∗ to each worker, it cannot improve its profit
(once again using the above argument). Let ǫ > 0 s.t.
xˆ′j ≤ δ∗− ǫ for all j ∈ Ai. Note that since workers in
Ai are worse off in the new outcome, they cannot be
deviators. Thus Ai maintain their original strategy
(to prefer the firm offering the highest payment).
Case 2a. P ′ 6= P ∗. Then there must be some
firm i s.t. n′i < ni (i.e. with fewer workers). In
particular, mi(1, n
′
i) ≥ mi(1, ni− 1). By Lemma 3.1,
mi(1, ni − 1) ≥ δ∗.
Case 2b. P ′ = P ∗. By the minimality of δ∗, there
is a firm i s.t. mi(1, ni) ≥ δ∗ (and this is in fact
an equality by Lemma 3.1). It thus holds for i that
mi(1, n
′
i) = mi(1, ni) ≥ δ∗.
Since in either case there is a firm s.t. mi(1, n
′
i) ≥
δ∗ (w.l.o.g. firm 1), we apply the following argument.
Firm 1 can re-deviate from (P ′,x′) by offering x′′1,j∗ =
δ∗ − ǫ/2 to a worker j∗ ∈ A2. Observe that x′′1,j∗ >
δ∗ − ǫ ≥ xˆ′j∗ = maxi>1 x′i,j∗ . Since j∗ /∈ R, her
strategy dictates she will now join firm 1. Thus in
the newly formed partition P ′′,
r′′1 = r
′
1+m1(1, n
′
1)−x′′1,j∗ ≥ r′1+δ∗−(δ∗−ǫ/2) > r′1,
i.e. firm i has an incentive to depart from the coali-
tion R. 
Non-homogeneous games If we restrict our-
selves to proportional policies, It can be shown
(see Example B.5 in the appendix) that coalition-
proofness, or even cartel-proofness, is unattainable.
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This holds even in the case of two firms, where we
know a proportional PSPE must exist. We conjec-
ture that a CP-PSPE may not exist for two firms
even if we relax the proportionality requirement.
4.4 Revenue distribution
In cases where an equilibrium exists, we are inter-
ested in how revenue is distributed between firms and
workers, focusing on symmetric weighted games. We
derive a closed formula for firms’ revenue in games
where we know a PSPE exists, and test how well it
generalizes to other weighted games.
We define a baseline estimate for a firm’s revenue
as follows.
r0
def.
= v(q) − δ · q, where
q = ⌊w(N)/k⌋ , δ = maxi v(Si)−mini v(Si)
maxiw(Si)−miniw(Si) .
Two symmetric firms Suppose that w(S1) ≥
w(S2). Then in the proportional equilibrium we get
that the payoff per unit of weight is δ = v(S1)−v(S2)w(S1)−w(S2)
as a special case of Theorem 4.1. Both firms get a
revenue of r = v(S1) − δw(S1) = v(S2) − δw(S2).
Note that as w(S1), w(S2) become closer, r becomes
closer to r0.
Almost-Balanced partitions Indeed, in cases
where an almost-balanced partition exists (and in
particular in homogeneous games), it can be shown
(see proof of Prop. 4.5) that the marginal value of
a unit of weight is δ = m(1, q). Then the rev-
enue of each firm is either v(q) − qδ = r0, or
v(q + 1) − (q + 1)δ = v(q + 1) −m(1, q) − qδ = r0.
That is, it exactly equals our baseline prediction. δ
can be thought of as the slope, or “derivative” of v
around the balanced point q. Thus as v is “more con-
cave”, the marginals decrease faster, the payments
to workers are lower, and the profit of the firms
increases. As a concrete example, if v(w) = wα
(for 0 < α < 1), then δ ≈ v′(q) = α · qα−1 and
r0 ≈ qα − q · α · qα−1 = (1− α)qα = (1 − α)v(q), i.e.
the firms keep a fraction of 1−α from the total value,
and the workers share the complement fraction of α.
Thus for both cases where the existence of equilib-
rium is guaranteed (two firms and almost-balanced
partitions), we have a closed form for firms’ revenue
in the “natural”, proportional, equilibrium.
Three symmetric firms Since with three firms
there is no PSPE that can be described in a closed
form, and sometimes no PSPE at all, we looked on
the entire range delimited by the lowest and high-
est revenue attainable in any PSPE. For each of the
randomized games generated in Section 4.2, and us-
ing the linear program LP (G,P ) described in Sec-
tion 3.2, we computed for every instance the PSPEs
that yield the minimal and the maximal revenue for
the firms, respectively (ignoring the few cases where
a PSPE did not exist). We then compared these val-
ues to our heuristic revenue prediction according to
the baseline r0 described above.
It turns out that the heuristic prediction is quite
accurate. When using the value function v(w) = wα
(for which r0 = 1 − α), the revenue was typically
within r0 ± 10%. When using a random value func-
tion there was a wider fluctuation of revenue, but the
baseline prediction r0 was almost always within the
range of observed values. For more details see Ap-
pendix C.3.
5 Games over a social network
We next turn to study a second class of games, where
the workers are a set of influential nodes in a social
network.
5.1 Network model
Consider a social network H = 〈V,EH〉 (a directed
graph), and a subset of “influencers” N ⊆ V . Given
some diffusion scheme in the network, every set S ⊆
N influences some portion of the nodes V , whose size
is denoted by IH(S).
Given such a social networkH and a set of firmsK,
we define a symmetric competition game where firms
recruit influencers, trying to advertise to as many
people (nodes of H) as possible. The value function
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of every firm is thus vi(S) = v(S) = IH(S).
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We apply one of the most widely known diffusion
schemes, called the independent cascade model, which
has been suggested by Kempe et al. [15]. We briefly
describe the diffusion process; for the full details see
the paper by Kempe et al.
In the Independent Cascade model, every edge
in the network H has an attached probability pu,u′ .
Once a node u is activated, it tries to activate once
each neighbor u′, and succeeds w.p. of pu,u′ , indepen-
dently of the state of any other node. Once a node is
activated, it remains active. The influence of a set S,
denoted by IH(S), is the expected number of nodes
that end up as active if we activate the set S.
vi(S) = v(S) = IH(S) =
∑
u∈V
pr(u is activated|S is active).
This is equivalent to summing the probabilities of all
percolations (subgraphs of H) in which there is a di-
rected path from some node in S to u. We should note
that IH(S) is a submodular function [15]. However,
IH(S) does not necessarily hold the gross-substitute
condition (see Appendix B.1).
While the independent cascade model seems to be
more powerful than the weighted model studied in
the previous section, it turns out that no model gen-
eralizes the other. Indeed, Example B.6 in the ap-
pendix demonstrates a weighted value function over
3 homogeneous workers, that cannot be represented
as the influence in any graph H . Therefore, weighted
value functions and influence value functions are two
different classes of submodular valuations. A natu-
ral question is whether a PSPE always exists with
two firms in the independent cascade model. Unfor-
tunately, the answer is negative in the general case
(as we show later in Section 5.3). Nevertheless, we
can show a weaker result by adding constraints on
the network structure.
We say that a network H = 〈V,EH〉 is t-sparse
(w.r.t the set N ⊆ V ), if every node u ∈ V can be
reached by at most t workers from N .
Intuitively, t-sparsity means that the influence
cones of different workers hardly intersect. A 1-sparse
8In principle, we can also define asymmetric games by using
a different network Hi for each firm.
network means that the cones of influence are pair-
wise mutually exclusive and thus that the influence is
completely additive (a trivial case). A 2-sparse net-
work means that two cones may intersect, but never
three or more. An n-sparse network puts us back in
the general case. In order to analyze sparse networks,
it will be useful to formally define synergy graphs.
5.2 Synergy graphs and sparse social
networks
A synergy graph is an undirected graph M =
〈N,EM 〉 with non-negative weights, where self-edges
are allowed. It can thus be represented as a sym-
metric matrix, which is also denoted by M . Every
synergy graphM induces a value function vM , where
the value of a coalition is the sum of weights of edges
between coalition members (including self edges), and
edges going outside the coalition. That is,
vM (S) =
∑
j∈S
M(j, j)+
∑
j,j′∈S,j<j′
M(j, j′)+
∑
j∈S
∑
j′′ /∈S
M(j, j′′).
Lemma 5.1. A value function v over a set of work-
ers N can be described by a synergy graph if and only
if it can be described as the influence in a 2-sparse
network. I.e. there is M s.t. v = vM iff there is H
s.t. v = IH .
As an intuition, the mapping is constructed s.t.
M(j, j′) equals the expected number of nodes that
are influenced by both worker j and worker j′ (i.e. the
intersection of their influence cones). Fig. 2 demon-
strates a network H and its corresponding synergy
graph M . Our main positive result in the network
model is the following.
Theorem 5.2. Let G = 〈N,K, vM 〉 be a symmetric
competition game with 2 firms over a synergy graph
M . Then G has a PSPE.
The outline of the proof is as follows. The maximal
cut in M is the optimal partition in G, and we set
the payoff of each worker j to be the average of her
total influence and her exclusive influence (i.e., xj =
v({j})+M(j,j)
2 ), and show that x induce a PSPE. On
the other hand, the above result does not extend to
games with more than two firms:
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(a) The network H
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8 A
B
C
(b) The matrix M
A B C
A 1 2 1
B 2 0 2
C 1 2 2
total 4 4 5
(c) The synergy graph M
A C
B
2 2
1
1 2
Figure 2: An example of a sparse network / synergy graph with three workers A,B and C. The maximal cut
in M , which is also the optimal partition, is P ∗ = ({A,C}, {B}). Then SW (P ∗) = v({A,C}) + v({B}) =
8 + 4 = 12.
Proposition 5.3. There is a symmetric competition
game with 3 firms over a synergy graph, that has no
PSPE.
For the proof of the proposition, see Example B.7
in the appendix. From the last two results and
Lemma 5.1, we have that a PSPE always exists in
symmetric games over 2-sparse networks when there
are two firms, but not with three or more.
5.3 Dense and asymmetric networks
What about asymmetric firms, or more influence net-
works that are not 2-sparse? Consider the following
example by Dobzinski and Schapira [10] of a sub-
modular combinatorial auction with two bidders and
4 items.
Example 5.4 ([10]). The first valuation function v1
is defined as follows:
The value function v2 is defined similarly, replacing
{1, 3} and {2, 4} with {1, 2} and {3, 4}. Dobzinski
and Schapira show that this game has no equilibrium.
v1(S) =


2, |S| = 1
3, |S| = 2, S 6= {1, 3} and S 6= {2, 4}
4, S = {1, 3} or S = {2, 4}
4, |S| ≥ 3
We next use Example 5.4 as a starting point, and
further develop it do derive negative results for com-
petition games over asymmetric and dense influence
networks.
We show how to construct a particular network
where the influence equals the production function v.
We first describe a single network that equals v1. The
networkH1 contains our four workersW = {1, 2, 3, 4}
and four other nodes A = {a1,2, a2,3, a3,4, a4,1}. To
every ai,j , there are edges with influence probability
1 both from i and from j. It is not hard to see that
for every S ⊆ A, IH1 (S) = v1(S). Note that v2 can
be constructed in a similar way by a network H2.
Corollary 5.5 (From Example 5.4). There is an
asymmetric competition game with two firms, each
over a different 2-sparse network, that has no PSPE.
Symmetric games The following lemma describes
a “symmetrization” that can be applied on any sub-
modular game with two firms.
Lemma 5.6. Let G = 〈N, {1, 2}, v1, v2〉 be a
submodular game with two firms. Let Z =
max{v1(N), v2(N)}, Z ′ > Z, and N ′ = N ∪ {x, y}.
Define a new value function v s.t. for every S ⊆ N ,
v(S) = v1(S) + v2(S) v(Sx) = v1(S) + Z + Z
′
v(Sy) = v2(S) + Z + Z
′ v(Sx,y) = 2Z + Z
′,
where Sx = S ∪ {x}, and likewise for y and {x, y}.
Then the symmetric game G′ = 〈N ′, {1, 2}, v〉 is sub-
modular. Further, G′ has a PSPE iff G has a PSPE.
Next, we apply such a symmetrization to con-
struct the full network H . H has the set of workers
{1, 2, 3, 4, x, y}. We have three sets of nodes: A is de-
fined as above, B = {b1,3, b3,2, b2,4, b4,1}, and another
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set C of size Z ′ > Z = 4. We add edges from W
to A as in H1 and to B as in H2. In addition, x is
connected to all of B ∪ C, and y is connected to all
of A∪C. It is easy to see that for all S ⊆ {1, 2, 3, 4},
v(Sx) = v1(S) + |C|+ |B| = v1(S) +Z ′ +Z = v(Sx),
and similarly for y. Also, v(Sx,y) = |A|+ |B|+ |C| =
2Z + Z ′, and v(S) = v1(S) + v2(S), as required in
Lemma 5.6.
Note that every node in H1, H2 is affected by ex-
actly two workers, and every node in H is affected
by three. We get the following result as a corollary.
Together with Corollary. 5.5 above it shows that the
conditions in Theorem 5.2 are minimal.
Proposition 5.7. There is a competition game over
a 3-sparse network H with two identical firms and no
PSPE.
6 Discussion
We considered combinatorial labor markets without
gross substitutes, and showed that a pure subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium is guaranteed to exist under
certain restrictions, with a special focus on the case
of few firms.
In games based on capacities (weights) with subad-
ditive production, we proved that a PSPE must exist
if there are two firms or if there is an almost balanced
partition, and demonstrated empirically that it often
exists even when neither condition applies.
When considering stability against deviations of a
coalition, we showed that whenever a PSPE exists,
then there is also a cartel-proof-PSPE.When workers
are homogeneous we proved that there is always a
coalition-proof-PSPE. This means that even if some
workers choose to collaborate with a cartel of firms,
then there is at least one agent—either a firm or a
worker—that will be better off outside this group.
As for the profit distribution, we offered a baseline
prediction where salaries depends on the marginal
contribution of one unit of weight, assuming weights
are equally divided. We showed that this prediction is
accurate whenever an almost-balanced partition ex-
ists, and gives a good estimation in other cases.
Finally, we showed that a PSPE always exists in a
particular case of the network model, when the net-
work is sparse and featuring two identical competing
firms. Unfortunately, there may not be a PSPE if
any of these conditions is violated.
Our results are summarized in Table 2.
Related work and implications An obvious dif-
ference between our setting and the KC model [14]
is that we studied value functions that do not hold
the gross-substitutes condition. More fundamentally,
Kelso and Crawford focused on the question of dy-
namics and convergence. In contrast, we proposed
a simpler two-step process, whose equilibria (PSPE)
are defined w.r.t. deviations of a single agent, but
turns out to coincide with Kelso and Crawford’s core.
In addition, we analyze stability to group deviations,
which becomes non-trivial in our model.
In the original KC model, workers can express pref-
erences over firms. We conjecture that some of our
results on the existence of PSPE can be extended to
this more general model, but not the results on coali-
tional stability. This is since the latter leans on sym-
metry between workers, which is broken once prefer-
ences are introduced.
The inverse economic model, in which firms com-
pete over consumers, rather than workers, is known
as Bertrand competition [2]. Such competitions have
been extended to combinatorial domains by Chawla
and Roughgarden [8], which described a particular
two-step interaction between sellers (the firms) and
consumers. While Chawla and Roughgarden do not
explicitly refer to subgame perfection, the solution
concept they apply coincides with PSPE.
Following Kelso and Crawford’s proof that every
set of firms (or bidders in combinatorial auctions)
whose value functions hold the gross substitutes prop-
erty, Gul and Stacchetti [11] studied the implica-
tions of this restriction. They showed that only a
tiny fraction of all submodular value functions are
gross substitutes. Further, they proved that for any
value function without this property, it is possible
to construct a market with no equilibrium. How-
ever, the construction by Gul and Stacchetti used an
unbounded number of firms/bidders (one for every
worker/item). Our results demonstrate that there are
value functions where the existence of equilibrium can
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be guaranteed if the number of firms is low. In par-
ticular, it follows from our results that a Walrasian
equilibrium always exists for two bidders, whose value
functions are either weighted or based on influence in
a sparse network.
Dobzinski and Schapira [10] study upper and lower
bounds on the integrality gap of various submodular
value functions. The integrality gap is an important
factor in the construction of efficient approximation
algorithms that find optimal allocations in combina-
torial auctions. For general submodular functions,
they show that the (maximal) integrality gap is be-
tween 87 and
4
3 . Since we essentially use the same
construction, we get that the lower bound of 87 still
applies for value functions based on sparse networks.
As for weighted functions, the integrality gap of Ex-
ample 4.4 is 4746 , which gives us a lower bound. An
interesting challenge is to find the maximal integral-
ity gap of instances that correspond to weighted or
network games. In particular, it is an open question
whether tighter bounds can be proved w.r.t. general
submodular functions.
Possible extensions In our model firms compete
only on the services of the workers, in separation from
other arenas in which they might affect one another.
However, if companies are also competing for mar-
ket share, then there are externalities: users in the
network that are exposed to an ad of one company
may become less likely to purchase the products of
its competitor. Ways to handle externalities between
coalitions have been studied in the cooperative games
literature (see e.g. [4]).
Other future extensions may consider more flexible
payoff schemes, such as those considered by Chat-
terjee et al.[7]. That is, the payment that a firm
promises to a given worker might be conditioned on
the generated value, or even on the particular set of
workers that select the firm. Allowing more flexible
strategies may expand the set of equilibria, perhaps
guarantying existence of PSPE in cases where it is
not attainable using fixed payoffs.
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A Proofs
We provide proofs for propositions in the order they
appear in the main text. Proofs for each Section X
appear in Appendix A.X.
A.2 Preliminaries
Lemma 2.4. Let G = 〈N,K, (vi)i∈K〉 be a competi-
tion game s.t. G has at least one PSPE. Let (P,x) be
a PSPE of G which minimizes the sum of workers’
payoffs x(N). Then (P,x) is also cartel-proof.
Proof. Let K ′ be a coalition of firms, and sup-
pose that there is a deviation to another outcome
(P ′,xK\K′ ,XK′). Suppose first that K
′ 6= K, i.e. at
least one firm is not part of the coalition K ′. Con-
sider any i ∈ K ′. Since there is at least one firm that
keeps the original strategy, offering xj to each worker
j. Therefore, i must pay at least xj to every worker
j ∈ S′i (regardless of the strategies ofK ′\{i}). There-
fore if r′i < ri, then i also has a unilateral deviation
from (P,x). However this is impossible as (P,x) is a
PSPE.
The second case is whereK = K ′, i.e. all firms col-
laborate. Denote by xˆ′ the realized payments then
are induced by the new outcome (P ′,X′). Since
SW (P ) ≥ SW (P ′), and r′i > ri for all i ∈ K, it
must be the case that xˆ′(N) = SW (P ′)−∑i∈K r′i <
SW (P ) −∑i∈K ri = x(N). Thus by our selection
of (P,x), we have that (P ′,X′) is not a PSPE. In
particular, either there is a worker j who prefers to
move (in which case we are done), or there is a firm i
and an alternative policy x′′i leading to an outcome
(P ′′, (X′−i,x
′′
i )), s.t. r
′′
i = vi(S
′′
i )−
∑
j∈S′′
i
x′′i,j > r
′
i.
Thus the coalition K is unstable, and (P,x) is
cartel-proof. 
A.3 Properties
Lemma 3.1. Let (P,x) be a PSPE outcome in game
G. Then for all i ∈ K and j ∈ Si,
1. xj ≤ mi(j, Si \ {j}).
2. For any i′ 6= i, xj ≥ mi′(j, Si′ ).
Proof. For the first part, note that if i pays j more
than its current marginal value, then i can gain by
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dismissing j. For the second part, if i pays j less than
its marginal value to i′, then i′ can gain by offering
j slightly more than its current payment. All other
payments remain unchanged, thus the new outcome
will be identical to P , except j will join i′ instead of
i. 
Lemma 3.4. If (P,x) is a PSPE in game G, then
there is a fair outcome (P,x∗) that is a PSPE in G,
where the profit of each firm remains the same.
Proof. Let (P,x) be a PSPE, and suppose that work-
ers j, j′ are of the same type, j ∈ Si and j′ ∈ Si′ . If
i 6= i′, then j, j′ must be paid the same. Otherwise,
suppose that xj < xj′ . firm i
′ will dismiss j′ and
recruit worker j instead by offering him xj+ ǫ (which
means that (P,x) is not stable).
If i = i′, then w.l.o.g. i can pay j, j′ the same
by equalizing the payment. That is, there is another
PSPE (P,x∗), where x∗j = x
∗
j′ =
xj+xj′
2 . 
Computation
Proposition A.1. Let G be a competition game with
a t types of workers, where t is fixed.
• Given an optimal partition P , with any number
of firms, we can find in polynomial time a pay-
ment vector x s.t. (P,x) is a PSPE of G (or
return that one does not exist).
• If the number of firms k is also fixed, then a
PSPE (P,x) can be computed in polynomial time
(or return that one does not exist).
Proof. Suppose that there is only a fixed number of
types t, with nj workers of each type. Then there
are
∏
j≤t(nj +1) ≤
(
n
t + 1
)t
types of subsets. More-
over, in a fair PSPE agents of the same type are paid
the same. We can therefore write and solve a much
smaller linear program, with t variables and at most
k · (n/t+ 1)t constraints. Since a linear program can
be solved in time that is polynomial in its size, the
first part of the proposition is settled.
Having a limited number of types also enables us
to efficiently find the optimal partition, if the num-
ber of firms is fixed as well. To see this, note that
there are
(
nj+k
k
)
ways to partition all workers of type
j among the firms. Since we can independently par-
tition each type, we have that the total number of
distinct partitions is
∏
j≤t
(
nj + k
k
)
≤
∏
j≤t
(
e(nj + k)
k
)k
= ek
∏
j≤t
(nj
k
+ 1
)k
≤ ek
∏
j≤t
( n
tk
+ 1
)k
= ek
( n
tk
+ 1
)tk
.
Together with the first part of the proposition, this
gives us an algorithm to find (P,x), by first gener-
ating an optimal partition, and then solve the linear
program corresponding to this partition. 
Efficient computation in weighted games The
algorithm above shows that if both the number of
firms k and the number of worker types t are fixed,
then we can compute a PSPE in polynomial time, or
return that such a solution does not exist (for any
competition game).
However, the time to find the optimal partition of
workers P is exponential in k ·t, making the computa-
tion infeasible even for fairly low values of k and t. As
weighted games have a particularly simple structure,
we hope that this will allow us a more efficient com-
putation. In the general weighted case it is computa-
tionally hard to find a PSPE even with two firms, as
this is equivalent to the Partition problem, which is
NP-hard. However, it is well-known that the Parti-
tion problem is in fact efficiently solvable if weights
are polynomially bounded. Indeed, we show that a
similar positive result is available in our setting as
well.
Note first that in such case the total weight of
agents selecting a firm is also bounded, and thus the
value functions can be represented as vectors of poly-
nomial length. Therefore the entire game has a com-
pact representation, for any number of worker types.
Proposition A.2. Let G = 〈N,K,w, (vi)i∈K〉 be
a weighted competition game with a fixed number
of firms k, and let W = w(N) =
∑
j∈N wj .
Then an optimal partition can be computed in time
O
(
n · k ·W k).
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Proof. We apply a dynamic algorithm that is similar
to the Partition algorithm. We first enumerate all
the possible ways to divide the total weightW among
the k firms, s.t. the total weight of firm i is ti (ignor-
ing the actual weights in w). There are at most W k
such ways, i.e. polynomial in n.
Next, we create a table with W k rows and n
columns. In every cell ((ti)i∈K , j) we write a par-
tition of workers {1, 2, . . . , j} to (S1, . . . , Sk), s.t.
w(Si) = ti – if such a partition exists. We fill the
table iteratively from column 1, where for every col-
umn j, and every non-empty cell ((ti)i∈K , j − 1), we
add worker j to each Si (if there is more than one
partition that fits in a cell we write one arbitrarily).
Thus we can fill every column in O(W k · k) opera-
tions, and the whole table in O(W k · k · n). Finally,
to find the optimal partition we compute the value of
every non-empty cell in the final column, and select
a partition of N that maximizes this value.
Note that when the number of types is limited,
then only a small fraction of each column will be
filled, and the algorithm becomes even faster. 
A-priory, there may be a large number of optimal
partitions, and we must try each one of them to find
whether there is a PSPE or not. In practice, in almost
every instance of the problem any optimal partition
induces a PSPE, and it is therefore sufficient to com-
pute a single arbitrary optimal partition P and solve
its related linear program.
A.4 Weighted games
Theorem 4.1. Let G = 〈N,K,w, v1, v2〉 be a
weighted competition game with two firms, then G
admits a proportional PSPE.
Proof. For any partition P = (S1, S2) we denote the
social welfare by SW (P ) = v1(S1) + v2(S2). Note
that the input w(S1) contains all the required infor-
mation to compute SW , thus we can write
SW (w(S1))
def.
= v1(w(S1)) + v2(W − w(S1)).
Let P ∗ = (S∗1 , S
∗
2 ) be a partition maximizing
the social welfare, and qi = w(S
∗
i ). Let j
′
i =
argminj∈S∗i wj and wˇi = wj
′
i
.
We first handle the case where qi = 0 for some
i, that is where all workers join the same firm. In
such case let w∗ = minj∈N wj . By setting the unit
payment to δ = vi(w
∗)/w∗, and x = δ ·w, we get a
PSPE: the marginal value of every set S with weight
w = w(S) ≥ w∗ is at most x(S) = δ ·w to firm i, and
at least x(S) to firm −i.
Assume therefore that both S∗1 , S
∗
2 are non-empty.
Since value functions are different, the marginal con-
tribution of each unit of weight to each firm may
also be different. We therefore replace the “slope”
δ with four different quantities y1, z1, y2, z2. We de-
note by yi, zi the normalized marginal value of the
“lightest” worker below and above the threshold qi,
respectively. Formally, yi =
1
wˇi
(vi(qi)− vi(qi − wˇi)),
and zi =
1
wˇ−i
(vi(qi + wˇ−i) − vi(qi)). Now, by sub-
additivity, yi ≥ zi for both firms. Also, yi ≥ z−i, as
otherwise there is a more efficient partition where −i
has worker j′i.
Next, set
d∗i = min
{
d ≥ 1 : vi(qi + d)− vi(qi)
d
≤ y−i
}
,
and
z∗i =
vi(qi + d
∗
i )− vi(qi)
d∗i
.
Clearly, yi, y−i ≥ z∗i ≥ zi and d∗i ≤ w−i. For a
graphical illustration, see Figure 3.
We define a unit payment δ = max{z∗1 , z∗2}. In
particular, yi ≥ δ ≥ z∗i ≥ zi for both firms. We set
the (proportional) payment policy so that xj = δwj .
The profit of firm i is
ri = vi(S
∗
i )−
∑
j∈Si
xj = vi(qi)− δw(qi).
Assume, toward a contradiction, that some firm
can deviate (w.l.o.g. firm 1), and keep a total weight
of q′ = w(S′1).
case 1. q′ < q1. Denote d
′ = q1 − q′, and the
marginal value (per unit) of the range [q′, q1] by t
′ =
v1(q1)−v1(q
′)
d′ (see Figure 4).
Since firm 1 increased the profit, t′ must be strictly
smaller than δ, as otherwise r′1 = r1−d′·t′+d′·δ < r1.
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Thus it is not possible that d′ ≥ wˇ1, as this would
entail t′ ≥ y1 ≥ δ.
On the other hand, t′ ≥ z∗1 by subadditivity of v1.
As δ = max{z∗1 , z∗2}, and δ > t′ ≥ z∗1 , we get that
t′ < δ = z∗2 . Therefore,
SW (q′) = v1(q
′) + v2(W − q
′)
= (v1(q1)− t
′ · d′) + v2(q2 + d
′)
= (v1(q1)− t
′ · d′) + v2(q2) + d
′ v2(q2 + d
′)− v2(q2)
d′
≥ (v1(q1)− t
′ · d′) + v2(q2) + d
′ v2(q2 + wˇ1)− v2(q2)
wˇ1
(since d′ < wˇ1 and v2 is subadditive)
= (v1(q1)− t
′ · d′) + v2(q2) + z
∗
2 · d
′
= (v1(q1)− t
′ · d′) + v2(q2) + δ · d
′
> v1(q1) + v2(q2) = SW (q1),
in contradiction to the optimality of P .
case 2. q′ > q1. Similarly, we denote d
′ = q′ − q1,
and it holds that d′ is smaller than wˇ2. Also, t =
v1(q
′)−v1(q1)
d′ must hold δ < t
′ < y1.
Now, if d′ ≥ d∗1, then we have t′ ≤ z∗1 . However
this is impossible as z∗1 ≤ δ < t′. Thus d′ < d∗1, and
by definition, t′ > y2. Then, similarly to case 1,
SW (q′) = (v1(q1) + t
′ · d′) + v2(q2 − d′)
= SW (q1) + t
′ · d′ − d′ v2(q2)− v2(q2 − d
′)
d′
≥ SW (q1) + t′ · d′ − d′ v2(q2)− v2(q2 − wˇ2)
wˇ2
(since d′ < wˇ2 and v2 is subadditive)
= SW (q1) + d
′ · t′ − d′ · y2
= SW (q1) + d
′(t′ − y2) > SW (q1),
which again contradicts the optimality of P . 
Proposition 4.5. Let G = 〈N,K,w, v〉 be a
weighted competition game with k symmetric firms.
(a) If there is an almost-balanced partition of w, then
G admits a proportional PSPE. (b) symmetry is a
necessary condition.
Proof of Proposition 4.5a. Let W =
∑
j∈N wj , and
q = ⌊W/k⌋. Set δ to be the marginal gain of a unit
weight in an almost-balanced partition, that is, δ =
v(q + 1)− v(q). In the PSPE policy, each firm offers
each worker j a payment of xj = δ · wj .
Let P ∗ be an almost balanced partition, i.e.
w(Si) = q or q + 1 for all i ∈ K. We argue that
(P ∗,x) is a PSPE in the suggested policy. Clearly
workers have no reason to deviate.
The profit of each firm is
ri = v(Si)−δ ·w(Si) = v(q)−δq = v(q+1)−δ(q+1).
Suppose some firm i deviates, and ends up with
S′i of weight q
′. This means that the workers in S′i
are being payed at least δ · w(S′i) = δq′ in total (as
otherwise there is a worker j payed less than xj).
Thus the profit of i becomes
r′i ≤ v(q′)− δq′ ≤ ri,
where the last inequality is since {q, q + 1} ⊆
argmaxq′∈N v(q
′)− δq′. 
Part (b) of the proposition follows from Exam-
ple B.4.
A.5 Networks games
Lemma 5.1. A value function v over a set of workers
N can be described by a synergy graph if and only if
it can be described as the influence in a 2-sparse net-
work. Formally, for any 2-sparse influence network
H there is a synergy graph M s.t. vM = IH ; and
for any synergy graph M (with integer weights) there
is a deterministic 2-sparse influence network H s.t.
IH = vM .
Note that since we can always multiply v by a pos-
itive constant, we can represent any synergy graph
with rational weights as an influence network.
Proof. For simplicity, we will consider deterministic
networks (where an edge means influence w.p. 1),
and synergy graphs with integer weights.
“⇒” Given a network H = 〈V,EH〉 and N ⊆ V ,
we define the following synergy matrix/graph of size
n×n. For every j ∈ N, u ∈ V , we say that j influences
u if there is a directed path from j to u in H (recall
that influence is deterministic).
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q2
wˇ2
y2 · wˇ2
wˇ1
v2(q2)
z2wˇ1
d∗2
z∗2d
∗
2
∠z∗2 = δ
q1
wˇ1
y1 · wˇ1
wˇ2
v1(q1)
z1wˇ2
Figure 3: The value functions of both firms in the partition P ∗. Here δ = max{z∗1 , z∗2} = z∗2 .
q1
wˇ1 wˇ2
v1(q1)
q′
d′
v1(q
′)
t′ · d′
∠t′
∠z∗1
∠z∗2 = δ
Figure 4: A deviation of firm 1 from the outcome (P ∗,x) to a policy where q′ = w(S′1) = q1 − 2.
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We set M(j, j′) as the number of nodes influ-
enced by both j and j′. In particular, the weight
of the self-edge M(j, j) is the number of nodes that
only j influences. Since H is 2-sparse, every node
is influenced by exactly 1 or 2 workers, and thus
IH(j) = M(j, j) +
∑
j′ 6=jM(j, j
′) =
∑
j′∈N M(j, j
′).
I.e., the sum of its row (or column) in the matrix M .
For a set S, we need to sum the rows of j ∈ S, and
then remove all nodes u ∈ V that have been counted
twice, i.e. cells M(j, j′) s.t. j, j′ ∈ S and j 6= j′.
Formally,
IH (S) =
∑
j∈S

M(j, j) + 1
2
∑
j′∈S\{j}
M(j, j′) +
∑
j′′∈N\{S}
M(j, j′′)

 = vM (S).
Next, we extend the proof to the case of general prob-
abilities on edges. For j 6= j′, suppose that a certain
node u ∈ V is influenced by j w.p. pj , and by j′ w.p.
pj′ . Then we add pjpj′ toM(j, j
′) for each such node.
Finally, we set M(j, j) = IH(j) −
∑
j′ 6=jM(j, j
′).
Note that M(j, j) is exactly the marginal contribu-
tion of j, i.e. the fraction of nodes that only j in-
fluences. Thus IH(S) = vM (S) as in the equation
above.
“⇐” Given a synergy graph/matrix M , we define
a set of nodes Vj,j′ for every pair j, j
′ ∈ N , whose size
is M(j, j′). Let V = N ∪⋃j,j′ Vj,j′ . We connect an
edge in H from every j ∈ N , to every u ∈ ⋃j′∈N Vj,j′ .
Thus we have once again IH(j) =
∑
j′∈N M(j, j
′) =
vM (j), and similarly for sets as in the equation above.

By applying both directions of the lemma, we get
as a corollary that any 2-sparse network with rational
probabilities can be replaced by a deterministic one.
Theorem 5.2. Let G = 〈N,K, vM 〉 be a sym-
metric competition game with 2 firms over a synergy
graph M . Then G has a PSPE.
Proof. Every partition of N to the two firms, is a cut
in M . Let S1, S2 be such a cut. By definition (after
rearranging terms), v(S) = vM (S) equals to
∑
j∈S

M(j, j) + 1
2
∑
j′∈S\{j}
M(j, j′) +
∑
j′′∈N\{S}
M(j, j′′)

 .
The last term is the weight of the cut (S,N \ {S}).
It is therefore easy to see that social welfare is max-
imized by taking the maximal cut inM . We still need
to set the payments properly to induce stability.
Let P ∗ = (S∗1 , S
∗
2) be some maximal cut in M ,
and let j ∈ S∗i . We set xj = 12 (v(j) + M(j, j)) =
M(j, j) + 12
∑
j′∈N\{j}M(j, j
′). We claim that the
payment policy x, with S∗1 , S
∗
2 is a PSPE.
Indeed, the revenue of either firm is
ri = v(Si)−
∑
j∈Si
xj = v(Si)−
∑
j∈Si

M(j, j) + 1
2
∑
j′∈N\{j}
M(j, j′)


=
∑
j∈Si

M(j, j) + 1
2
∑
j′∈Si\{j}
M(j, j′) +
∑
j′′∈S−i
M(j, j′′)

−
∑
j∈Si

M(j, j) + 1
2
∑
j′∈Si\{j}
M(j, j′) +
1
2
∑
j′′∈S−i
M(j, j′′)


=
1
2
∑
j∈Si
∑
j′∈S−i
M(j, j′) =
1
2
∑
j∈S1
∑
j′∈S2
M(j, j′),
i.e. half the weight of the cut P ∗ (in particular r1 =
r2). Suppose that some firm (w.l.o.g. firm 1) changes
its policy, which leads to some cut (S′1, S
′
2), and some
profit r′1.
For the new outcome to be a PSPE, firm 1 must
pay at least xj to each j ∈ S′1.
The new profit of firm 1 turns out to be at most
half the weight of the new cut P ′:
r
′
1 = v(S
′
1)−
∑
j∈S′
1
x
′
j ≤ v(S
′
1)−
∑
j∈S′
1
xj
=
∑
j∈S′
1

M(j, j) + 1
2
∑
j′∈S′
1
\{j}
M(j, j′) +
∑
j′′∈S2
M(j, j′′)

−
∑
j∈S1

M(j, j) + 1
2
∑
j′∈S1\{j}
M(j, j′) +
1
2
∑
j′′∈S2
M(j, j′′)


=
1
2
∑
j∈S′
1
∑
j′∈S′
2
M(j, j′).
However, since P ∗ is the optimal (heaviest) cut, we
get that r′1 ≤ w(S′1, S′2) ≤ w(S∗1 , S∗2 ) = r1, and thus
there is no profitable deviation. 
Lemma 5.6. Let G = 〈N, {1, 2}, v1, v2〉 be
a submodular game with two firms. Let Z =
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max{v1(N), v2(N)}, Z ′ > Z, and N ′ = N ∪ {x, y}.
Define a new value function v s.t. for every S ⊆ N ,
v(S) = v1(S) + v2(S)
v(Sx) = v1(S) + Z + Z
′
v(Sy) = v2(S) + Z + Z
′
v(Sx,y) = 2Z + Z
′,
where Sx = S ∪ {x}, and likewise for y and {x, y}.
Then the symmetric game G′ = 〈N ′, {1, 2}, v〉 is sub-
modular. Further, G′ has a PSPE iff G has a PSPE.
Proof. Set Z ′′ = Z + Z ′. We first show that v is
submodular. Let S, T ⊆ N . Clearly v(S ∪ T ) ≤
v(S) + v(T )− v(S ∩ T ).
v(Sx ∪ T ) = v1(S ∪ T ) + Z ′′
≤ v1(S) + v1(T )− v1(S ∩ T ) + Z ′′ (1)
= v(Sx) + (v1(T )− v1(S ∩ T ))
= v(Sx) + (v(Tx)− v(Sx ∩ Tx)).
v(Sx,y ∪ T ) = 2Z + Z ′ = v(Sx,y)
≤ v(Sx,y) + v(T )− v(Sx,y ∩ T ) (2)
v(Sx) + v(Ty) = v1(S) + v2(T ) + 2Z
′′
≥ v1(S ∩ T ) + v2(S ∩ T ) + 2Z ′′ = v(S ∩ T ) + 2Z ′′,
Thus,
v(Sx ∪ Ty) = 2Z + Z
′ < 2Z′′ ≤ v(Sx) + v(Ty)− v(S ∩ T ).
All other cases follow directly from these cases.
Since any PSPE is maximizing the social welfare,
x and y must go to distinct firms. This is since for
every S, T ⊆ N ,
v(Sx,y)+v(T ) = 2Z+Z
′+v(T ) = Z+v(Ty) < v(Sx)+v(Ty).
Finally, since v(Sx), v(Ty) are just v1(S), v2(T )
shifted by a constant Z ′′, there is no PSPE in G =
〈N,K, v〉. 
B Examples
B.1 The Gross-substitutes condition
Informally, the gross-substitutes (GS) condition
states that workers can “substitute” one another—
if the salary of some workers rises and the salary of
other remains the same, then a firm would never want
to dismiss or replace workers whose salary remains
the same [14].
Definition 3 (Gross substitutes [14]). A value func-
tion v : 2N → R+ holds the gross substitutes condi-
tion if the following holds.
Suppose that under prices x the set S ⊆ N maxi-
mizes the profit r(S,x) = v(S)−x(S), and let T ⊆ S,
x′ ≥ x where x′j = xj for all j ∈ T . Then there is a
set S′ ⊆ N maximizing r(S′,x′) s.t. T ⊆ S′.
The following example shows that a weight-based
valuation function may not hold the GS condition.
Example B.1. Consider the valuation function
v(w) = min{w, 6}. We have five workers, two of
weight 3 and three of weight 2, i.e. w = (3, 3, 2, 2, 2).
With the payoff vector x = w/2, there are two op-
timal subsets: S1 = {3, 3} and S2 = {2, 2, 2}, each
yielding a profit of v(6) − 6/2 = 3. Suppose the firm
employs S1, and we now raise the salary of one of
the 3-workers from x1 = 1.5 to x
′
1 = 2. The unique
optimal selection under x′ = (x′1, x−1) is now S2.
This already violates the GS condition, since x2 did
not change, yet worker 2 is not part of any optimal
solution.
Similarly, if the firm employs S2 and we raise the
salary of one of the 2-workers, then the unique opti-
mal solution S1 does not contain the 2-workers whose
salary remains the same.
We can similarly show that valuation functions de-
fined by synergy graphs/sparse influence networks
may not hold the GS condition. Indeed, consider
the valuation function v1 from Example 5.4. Under
the payoff vector x = (1, 1, 1, 1) the set S1 = {1, 3} is
optimal. However if the salary of worker 1 increases,
then the unique optimal set is S2 = {2, 4}. S2 does
not include worker 3 even though x′3 = x3, and thus
violates the GS condition.
B.2 Weighted games
A non-subadditive game
Example B.2. consider a homogeneous and sym-
metric game with a weighted (non-subadditive) value
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function v = (0, 3, 4, 6), two firms, and three workers.
Assume towards a contradiction that there is a PSPE
((S1, S2),x). W.l.o.g. x is fair (by Lemma 3.4).
By the FWT, (S1, S2) must be an optimal partition,
thus one firm (w.l.o.g. firm 1) has two workers,
v(S1) = v(2) = 4, v(S2) = v(1) = 3. The marginal
value of each worker to firm 1 is 1, thus they are paid
at most 1 each. The marginal value of an additional
worker to this firm is 2. Thus firm 2 must pay its
worker at least 2. However, by fairness all workers
must be paid the same amount. A contradiction.
An experimental analysis shows that in non-
subadditive weighted competition games generated at
random, no PSPE usually exists (see Appendix C.2).
A symmetric game with three firms
Example B.3. We consider the following com-
petition game with 3 firms, which has no PSPE.
The game has 11 workers, with weights w =
(8, 8, 8, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 2, 2, 2). The value function is
v(w) =
√
w. It is easy to verify that there are exactly
four optimal partitions (up to permutations of agents
of the same type), in all of which the total weights
are w(S1) = 14, w(S2) = 15, and w(S3) = 16 . The
partitions are as follows.
P1 = ({8, 2, 2, 2}, {3, 3, 3, 3, 3}, {8, 8})
P2 = ({3, 3, 3, 3, 2}, {8, 3, 2, 2}, {8, 8})
P3 = ({8, 3, 3}, {3, 3, 3, 2, 2, 2}, {8, 8})
P4 = ({8, 3, 3}, {8, 3, 2, 2}, {8, 3, 3, 2})
For each of these partitions, Matlab’s linprog
function returns a set of conflicting constraints in
the corresponding linear program. Therefore, none
of these optimal partitions can be stabilized, and by
FWT there is no PSPE.
For higher values of k, we can use the same exam-
ple with additional firms. For each extra firm i > 3,
we add a worker with weight 100. Thus each addi-
tional firm will hire one heavy worker without affect-
ing the competition between the original firms.
An asymmetric, balanced game
Example B.4. We define a game with three firms
and three workers of weight 11, and six workers of
weight 2. The value functions are defined as v1(w) =
min{w, 20}; v2(w) = min{w, 19}; v3(w) = min{w, 6}.
First note that a balanced partition exists,
where each firm has one 11-worker and two
2-workers. The optimal partition is P =
({11, 11}; {11, 2, 2, 2, 2}; {2, 2}), and has a welfare of
SW (P ) = v1(22)+ v2(19)+ v3(4) = 20+19+4 = 33.
(if all three firms have an 11-worker, then SW ≤
22 + 12 + 6 = 40) Assume towards a contradiction
that there is a PSPE (P, (x2, x11).
By Lemma 3.1, x2 = 2. Now, suppose firm 2
recruits an 11-worker instead of all four 2-workers.
Then
r2 = 19−x11−4x2 ≥ r′2 = 19−2x11 ⇒ x11 ≥ 4x2 = 8.
On the other hand, if firm 1 recruits three 2-workers
instead of an 11-worker,
r1 = 20−2x11 ≥ r′1 = 19−x11−3x3 ⇒ x11 ≤ 1+3x2 = 7.
Thus we have a contradiction.
A game with no proportional cartel-proof
PSPE
Example B.5. We consider the following competi-
tion game with two firms and 4 workers, with weights
1, 2, 3, 5. There are two optimal partitions, in both of
which the there is a firm with total weight 6, that hires
the worker 1. By Lemma 3.1, x1 = 1 in any PSPE
(P,x). Thus in any proportional PSPE, xj = wj
for all j ∈ N . Now, both firms can collaborate by
lowering the payoff of workers 3 and 5 by 1, so that
x′ = (1, 2, 2, 4). The new outcome (P,x′) is also a
PSPE, thus no firm wants to deviate from it. How-
ever, (P,x′) is a (group) deviation from (P,x), thus
(P,x) is not a coalition-proof, or even cartel-proof.
B.3 Network games
There is a weighted value function over 3 homoge-
neous workers, that cannot be represented as the in-
fluence in any graph H .
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Example B.6. Denote by f(S) the expected frac-
tion of nodes in V that is influenced by all work-
ers in S. For a deterministic network this simply
means the number of nodes u ∈ V s.t. for every
j ∈ S there is a path from j to u. More generally,
f(S) =
∑
u∈V f(u, S) where f(u, S) is the the total
probability of all percolations in which there are paths
to u from every j ∈ S and from no j′ ∈ N \ S. It
is straightforward to see that IH(S) =
∑
T∩S 6=∅ f(T )
for all S ⊆ N .
Now, consider the weighted value function v =
(0, 3, 6, 8). Since mv(1, 2) = 8 − 6 = 2, we have
that f(j) = m(j, {j′, j′′}) = mv(1, 2) = 2 for all
j ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Next,
m(j′, j) = I({j, j′})− I({j})
= f(j) + f(j′) + f(j, j′) + f(j, j′′) + f(j′, j′′) + f(j, j′, j′′)
− (f(j) + f(j, j′) + f(j, j′′) + f(j, j′, j′′))
= f(j′) + f(j′, j′′) = 2 + f(j′, j′′),
thus
2 + f(j′, j′′) = m(j′, j) = mv(1, 1) = 6− 3 = 3,
which entails that f(j′, j′′) = 1 for every pair of work-
ers. Finally,
3 = v(1) = I({1}) = f(1) + f(1, 2) + f(1, 3) + f(1, 2, 3)
= 2 + 1 + 1 + f(1, 2, 3) = f(1, 2, 3) + 4,
i.e. f(1, 2, 3) = −1. This is a contradiction since
every f(T ) is a sum of probabilities and thus cannot
be negative.
Example B.7. Consider a game with three firms,
and a set of workers N = {a1, a2, b1, b2, b3}, where in
the graph M every pair of workers in connected (with
weight 1), except the pair (a1, a2). In the optimal
partition (which maximizes the weight of the multicut
P = (S1, S2, S3)), a1 and a2 must share a firm. Thus
w.l.o.g. S1 = {a1, a2}, S2 = {b1, b2}, S3 = {b3}, and
SW (P ) = 6 + 7 + 4 = 17.
Assume, w.l.o.g., that a PSPE (P,x) exists. Then
by fairness all of the ai workers are payed the same
amount xa, and similarly for the bi workers. Thus
we only need to find the values xa and xb. By envy-
freeness, firm 2 and 3 make the same revenue, thus
r2 = v(S2) − 2xb = v(S3) − xb, i.e. xb = 7 − 4 =
3, and r2 = r3 = 1. Firm 1 must have the same
revenue as well, thus 1 = r1 = v(S1)−2xa = 6−2xa,
and xa = 2.5. However, firm 1 has a deviation, by
refusing worker a2, and recruit a b worker instead.
Then
r′1 = v({a1, b1})−xa− (xb+ ǫ) = 7−5.5− ǫ > 1 = r1.
Intuitively, it seems that a generalization to k > 2
can be easily constructed by considering a multicut
(rather than a cut). However, this intuition is mis-
leading.
The following example shows where this intuition
fails. Consider a network H , containing three influ-
encers and three nodes with weights 1, 2, 3. Each
node is influenced by exactly two influencers (w.p.
1). The resulting 3 × 3 matrix induces a graph M
that is a triangle, whose edge weights are 1, 2 and 3
(i.e. all three edges have different weights). If pay-
ments are set according to the scheme above then the
profit of every firm will be half the weight of the cut
between himself and the others. Then the firm that
recruited the lightest influencer (and hence has the
lightest part of the cut) is envious in the other firms.
However, this game does have the following PSPE:
P = ({a}, {b}, {c}), x = (2, 3, 4), where the profit of
every firm is 1.
C Experimental results
We implemented a program that solves any given
symmetric weighted game G, using Matlab 7. We
used a variation of the algorithm above to find an ar-
bitrary optimal partition P ∗, then applied the Mat-
lab linprog function to solve the induced linear pro-
gram, i.e. to find a payment vector x s.t. (P ∗,x) is
a PSPE of G . An instance with k = 3 and n ≤ 15
is typically solved in less than a second, so that it is
possible to collect statistics. In the few cases where
a stable payment vector x was not found, we labeled
this instance as “no solution”, without trying any
other partition. Thus it is possible that the actual
number of instances with no PSPE is even smaller.
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C.1 Experimental setting
We generated three datasets with the following char-
acteristics.
• Dataset D1 had 3000 instances. Each instance
had between 5 and 14 workers, divided to 2-4
types. The weight of each type was in the range
2-15, and the total weight was limited to un-
der 80. 1053 instances (32%) had a balanced or
nearly balanced partition. In 4 instances the se-
lected partition could not be stabilized with pay-
ments (this does not necessarily mean that the
instance has no PSPE, as we did not try other
partitions).
• Dataset D2 had 3000 instances. Each instance
had between 4 and 11 workers, with weights in
the range 2-15, and no restriction on the number
of types. The total weight limit was 80. 1548 in-
stances (52%) had a balanced or nearly balanced
partition. In all instances, the selected partition
induced a PSPE.
• DatasetD3 includes the first 200 instances ofD1.
In datasets D1 and D2 we used a random subadditive
value function for each instance. This is by sampling
the marginal values uniformly from [0, 1], and then
sort them in decreasing order. For D3 we used the
value function f(w) = wα, for various values of 0 <
α < 1.
Since we only got a handful of instances with no
pure equilibrium, we did not make a statistical anal-
ysis of these samples. To test the importance of sub-
additivity, we also generated random value functions
without enforcing subadditivity. In this case only 910
from the instances in D1 (27%) had stable payments
(for the selected optimal partition), and slightly more
(33%) in D2.
C.2 Experimental validation of the
heuristic payment policy
For every instance in each of the datasets D1 and
D2, we computed the heuristic payment vector x
∗ as
follows.
Let P ∗ = (S1, S2, S3) be the optimal partition,
i+ = argmaxi∈K w(Si), i− = argmini∈K w(Si), then
z0 =
v(w(Si+ ))−v(w(Si−))
w(Si+)−w(Si− )
. In the induced proportional
payoff vector, x∗(j) = z0 · wj for all j ∈ N . For ev-
ery instance G, we measured the maximal amount a
firm can gain by deviating from the profile (P ∗,x∗).
Formally, h(G, x∗) = maxi∈K,S′⊆N (v(S
′)− x∗(S′))−
(v(Si)− x∗(Si)). The profits are normalized to 1, so
that h(G, x∗) = 0.2 for example, means that there
is a firm in G that can increase its profit by 20% by
deviating from x∗.
We sorted the instances according to h(G, x∗), and
plotted a survival graph showing the percentage of
instances for which h(G, x∗) < h (Figures 5 and 6).
The following trends are apparent from the graphs:
1. For most instances, h(G, x∗) = 0. That is,
(P ∗, x∗) is PSPE.
2. For roughly 95% of the instances in D1 (97% in
D2), h(G, x
∗) ≤ 0.05.
3. As the gap d = w(Si+) − w(Si− ) increases,
h(G, x∗) also increases.
4. In D2, where the types are more diverse,
h(G, x∗) is lower, i.e. the heuristic solution is
more stable. However if we condition on the gap
d (see dashed lines), then there is no significant
difference.
It seems therefore that the diversity of types is re-
sponsible mainly for the reduction in the average gap
d, which in turn explains the improvement of the
heuristic solution.
C.3 Experimental profit distribution
for three firms
With more than two firms, a PSPE is not guaranteed
to be exist. Moreover, even when such a PSPE does
exist, it will rarely be proportional (unless there hap-
pens to be an almost-balanced partition). We study
the average case behavior by generating random in-
stances and solve them as explained in the previous
section. Thus we get the maximal and minimal share
of the profit that firms may keep, and compare it with
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our baseline estimation of r0 = v(q) − z0 · q, where
q =
⌊∑
j wj/k
⌋
and z0 defined as above.
For every instance we computed the minimal and
maximal revenue for firms in equilibrium, under the
chosen partition (recall that in anonymous games,
the profit of all firms is the same). Since the rev-
enue of each firm r is proportional to SW (P ∗) −
max{∑j∈N xj}, in order to minimize r we should
maximize x(N) and vice versa.
Figures 7, 8, and 9 display how well the baseline
r0 predicts the actual revenue that firms can make
in equilibrium. We can see that for the value func-
tion v(w) = wα, the actual revenue is quite close to
r0 = 1 − α, regardless of workers’ weights (Fig. 9).
When the value function is random, we have a wider
spread between the minimal and the maximal revenue
of many instances. Still, the baseline r0 is almost al-
ways in this range.
An interesting observation is that the existence of
a PSPE depends almost entirely on the weight vec-
tor w, and not on the value function v (as long as it
is subadditive). In contrast, as can be seen in Fig-
ure 9, the profit distribution between firms and work-
ers largely depends on the curvature of v, but almost
not at all on the weights of workers.
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Figure 5: A survival curve of the percentage of instances from the dataset D1, for which h(G, x
∗) ≤ h. The
solid line is showing statistics for all instances. The dashed lines are the curves of instances with a particular
gap d = qi+−qi− . We can see that as the gap increases, the stability of the heuristic solution x∗ deteriorates.
We can also see that for almost 60% of the instances, h(G, x∗) = 0, i.e. the heuristic solution is stable.
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Figure 6: The survival curve of the dataset D2. Here the heuristic solution is stable (h(G, x
∗) = 0) for over
85% of the instances.
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Figure 7: Actual revenue (minimal and maximal) w.r.t the predicted value r0, for 800 random instances from
D1. The solid lines demarcate the area containing 90% of the total 3000 samples for which the prediction is
most accurate.
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Figure 8: Revenue distribution in instances from D2.
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Figure 9: Revenue distribution in instances from D3 (where v(w) = w
α). We can see that the outcomes are
clustered into 9 groups, each for one value of α (the leftmost corresponds to α = 0.9).
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